| TO: |
Chief Executive Officers, Chief Risk Officers and
Compliance Officers of All National Banks, Federal Branches
and Agencies, Technology Service Providers, Department and
Division Heads, and All Examining
Personnel |
Purpose
This bulletin presents guidance to national banks for due
diligence, underwriting, and monitoring of entities that process
payments for telemarketers and other merchant clients. As detailed
in several OCC issuances, certain merchants, such as telemarketers,
pose a higher risk than other merchants and require additional due
diligence and close monitoring. This bulletin supplements, but does
not replace, existing guidance related to Automated Clearing House
(ACH) risk management, merchant processing, and remotely-created
checks (RCCs).
Background
The OCC has seen a variety of relationships between banks and
processors in which the processor uses its bank relationship to
process payments for merchant clients. Often the processor uses a
bank account as the vehicle to conduct such payment processing. For
example, a processor may be a bank customer that deposits into its
account RCCs generated on behalf of merchant clients. A processor
may also act as a third-party sender of ACH transactions,
originating debits for its merchant clients through its customer
relationship with the bank. In either case, the bank often has no
direct customer relationship with the merchant. Risks are heightened
when neither the processor nor the bank performs adequate due
diligence on the merchants for which they are originating payments.
When a bank has a relationship with a processor, it is exposed to
risks that may not be present in relationships with other commercial
customers. The bank encounters strategic, credit, compliance,
transaction, and reputation risks in these relationships. Banks have
two distinct areas of responsibility to control these risks. The
first is due diligence and underwriting, and the second is
monitoring these high-risk accounts for high levels of unauthorized
returns and for suspicious or unusual patterns of activity. Proper
initial due diligence, effective underwriting, and ongoing account
monitoring are critical for bank safety and soundness and consumer
protection. Banks should implement these controls to reduce the
likelihood of establishing or maintaining an inappropriate
relationship with a processor through which unscrupulous merchants
can gain access to consumers’ bank accounts.
Banks should also consider carefully the legal, reputation, and
other risks presented by relationships with processors including
risks associated with customer complaints, returned items, and
potential unfair or deceptive practices.1 Banks that do
not have the appropriate controls to address the risks in these
relationships may be viewed as facilitating a processor’s or its
merchant client’s fraud or other unlawful activity. Banks should be
alert for processors that use more than one bank to process payments
for merchant clients and should subject such processors to great
scrutiny. Processing through multiple banks may be a signal that the
processor recognizes a risk that one or more of these processing
relationships may be terminated as a result of suspicious,
fraudulent, or other unlawful conduct.2
Risk Management: Effective Due Diligence, Underwriting,
and Monitoring
The OCC has provided guidance to national banks regarding
relationships with processors. For example, banks must implement a
due diligence and underwriting policy that, among other things,
requires an initial background check of the processor and its
underlying merchants to support the validity of the processor’s and
merchants’ businesses, their creditworthiness, and business
practices.3 Moreover, the OCC has also provided banks
detailed procedures for merchant underwriting and review, as well as
for fraud monitoring.4 Banks should review carefully the
validity and creditworthiness of all processors and merchants.
Controls should be more rigorous for higher-risk processors and
merchants (e.g., telemarketers). Although some processors
may process transactions for reputable telemarketing merchants,
these merchants in aggregate have displayed a much higher incidence
of unauthorized returns or chargebacks, which is often indicative of
fraudulent activity.
Due diligence, underwriting and account monitoring are especially
important for banks in which processors deposit RCCs and through
which processors initiate ACH transactions for their merchant
clients. Banks should be alert to processors’ merchant clients that
obtain personal bank account information inappropriately. The
merchant may have misused the customer information to facilitate the
creation of an unauthorized RCC or ACH debit file by the
processor.5 To ensure effective risk management, banks
that initiate transactions for processors should require the
processor to provide information on their merchant clients such as
the merchant’s name, principal business activity, and geographic
location.6 Banks should verify directly, or through the
processor, that the originator of the payment (i.e. the
merchant) is operating a legitimate business. Such verification
could include comparing the identifying information against public
record databases and fraud and bad check databases, comparing the
identifying information with information from a trusted third party,
such as a credit report from a consumer reporting agency, or
checking references from other financial institutions. With respect
to account monitoring, a bank should not accept high levels of
returns7 on the basis that the processor has provided
collateral or other security to the bank.
By implementing the appropriate controls over processors and
their merchant clients, a bank should be able to identify those
processors that process for fraudulent telemarketers or other
unscrupulous merchants and to ensure that the bank is not
facilitating these transactions. In the event a bank identifies
fraudulent or other improper activity with a processor or a specific
merchant client of the processor, the bank should take immediate
steps to address the problem, including filing a Suspicious Activity
Report when appropriate, terminating the bank’s relationship with
the processor, or requiring the processor to cease processing for
that specific merchant.
Banks are required to have Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
(BSA/AML) compliance programs and appropriate policies, procedures,
and processes to monitor and identify unusual activity.
Additionally, the FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual reiterates the
OCC’s expectation that banks effectively assess and manage their
risks with respect to third-party processors. Processors generally
are not subject to BSA/AML regulatory requirements. As a result,
some processors may be vulnerable to money laundering, identity
theft, fraud schemes, and illicit transactions or transactions
prohibited by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The bank’s risk
management program should include procedures for monitoring
processor information such as merchant data, transaction volume, and
charge-back history.8
Conclusion
The OCC supports national banks’ participation in payment systems
to serve the needs of legitimate processors and the customers of
such processors and to diversify sources of revenue. However, to
limit potential risk to banks and consumers, banks should ensure
implementation of risk management programs that include appropriate
oversight and controls commensurate with the risk and complexity of
the activities. At a minimum, bank programs should verify the
legitimacy of the processor’s business operations, assess the bank’s
risk level, and monitor processor relationships for activity
indicative of fraud.
Additional Information
For additional information related to managing the risks
associated with retail payment activities please refer to:
- OCC Bulletin 2006-39, ACH Activities: Risk Management
Guidance.
- The “Merchant Processing” booklet of the Comptroller’s
Handbook.
- OCC Bulletin 2006-13, Amendments to Regulation CC and J.
- OCC Bulletin 2001-47, Third-Party Relationships: Risk
Management Principles.
- The “Outsourcing Technology Services” booklet of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
Information Technology (IT) Examination Handbook.
- The “Retail Payment Systems” booklet of the FFIEC IT
Examination Handbook.
- The FFIEC Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML)
Examination Manual.
Please direct any questions or comments to the Operational Risk
Policy Division at (202) 874-5190.
/signed/
Mark L. O’Dell Deputy Comptroller for Operational Risk
|
1 See 15 USC 45. See also OCC
Advisory Letter 2002-3, Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices.
2 See, e.g., OCC Bulletin
2006-39, p.10.
3 See the “Merchant
Processing” booklet of the Comptroller’s Handbook, pp.
24-28, 34; The FFIEC’s Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
Examination Manual, Third Party Payment Processors; and OCC Bulletin
2006-39, pp. 5, 10-11.
4 See the
“Merchant Processing” booklet of the Comptroller’s
Handbook, pp. 24-28.
5 Though the Merchant
Processing booklet of the Comptroller’s Handbook addresses directly
merchant card acquiring, its principles and most of the procedures
outlined in the handbook are also applicable to the processing of
other payment instruments, including RCCs and ACH transactions.
See, e.g., OCC Bulletin 2006-39, footnote 7 and associated
text.
6 See OCC Bulletin 2006-39. A
background check on the principal business owners supplements the
underwriting of the merchant client. It is not uncommon for
unscrupulous owners to use multiple business entities to avoid
detection.
7 Generally, a bank should not accept
high levels of returns regardless of the return reason. High levels
of RCCs or ACH debits returned for insufficient funds can be an
indication of fraud.
8 FFIEC BSA/AML Examination
Manual, p. 210 (Third-Party Payment Processors). See also
OCC Bulletin 2006-39.
|